Andrea Menna
Abstract: Under the post-war liberal-democratic regimes, the majority principle rules over all, tosuch a degree that not only the idea of democracy matches that of the rule of majority,but most of all, the rule of majority has succeeded in being considered the sole democratic rule by definition. It is useful to look at attempts to define and accept political positions not on the basis of their correspondence with the common good, but only in the force of acquiring a majority. Therefore, what seems to be the principle guaranteeing democracy may well be the instrument that undermines the democratic system. For example, secessionist movements or even forces that support anti-liberal-democratic positions establish their legitimacy in their rhetoric precisely on the basis of their electoral success, particularly by way of referenda. What we point out in this article is that the majority principle is neither natural nor rooted far back in history. Throughout classical antiquity, deliberative and elective procedures were designed and implemented to meet the needs of the elites who benefited from the same. The principle of the majority as we know it today did not exist in ancient Greece – as opposed to what is customarily believed – nor in other historical experiences of human collectives at least up until the sixteenth century. In this article we choose to discuss two of the historical experiences representative of the development of the majority principle: the case of the Greek Pólis and the case of the Roman Church. The latter will be analysed both by the historical evolution of elective processes and by the importance of doctrinal elaboration of canon law in this respect.