Ileana Dascălu
Abstract: This paper discusses the Rawlsian principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity in the context of Fishkin’s recent theory of opportunity pluralism, and shows why these are conceptually incompatible. Although the substantive dimension of FEO (in contrast with “careers open to talents”) has invited reflection on how “merit” and “talent” should be defined from the perspective of social justice, opportunity pluralism requires a theoretical step further that would entail abandoning the Rawlsian principle altogether. Therefore, if we agree with Fishkin, the egalitarian focus of FEO should be replaced with the concern for broadening the range of developmental opportunities open to individuals at various moments of their lives. This, according to opportunity pluralism, would serve justice better than guaranteeing equality of opportunity in the absence of a safety net supposed to correct the myriad of natural and social contingencies affecting individuals’ life chances.