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# STRUCTURAL NEGATIVITY OF VALUE JUDGMENTS

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## *Abstract*

In certain theories of philosophy of culture, the abstract aspect of values is emphasized, and, consequently, the values are treated as mere concepts. The formal kind in which they appear in any theoretical context is that of a *value judgment*. In this paper, I will develop the idea about a meaning of “negativity” implied in the structure of a value judgment. I intend, starting from Kant’s theory on the judgment of taste (about the beautiful), to point out a direction in which a critique of our prejudgments concerning the values is possible, along with a (philosophical) reconstruction of the culture. The meaning of negativity is present in the structure of any kind of value judgment, and its genesis is a non-judicative experience. All my arguments focus on this idea.

**Keywords:** *value judgment, negativity, judgment of taste, value, non-judicative experience, Kant.*

## §1. Introduction

Nowadays, when people are more and more affected and consequently interested in the problem of intercultural relations, the concept of value and the positive character of values are a starting point in scientific researches, and political debates. Even in certain contexts of philosophizing the value is taken for granted, whether in general or in special discourse. Nevertheless, the value is a correlative term of culture, so that a philosophical investigation of the value implies a reflection on the culture. Moreover, with unimportant differences, philosophers and scholars in philosophy

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deem all values – such as beauty, truth, goodness – as a positive human fact, and a necessary model in order to perform many people's practices. In fact, they often appear as indispensable rules for different kinds of human activities.

In the history of philosophy there are some moments when this issue regarding the ontological, epistemological, anthropological, psychological status of values was questioned, ones of them in a radical way; for instance, Nietzsche's critique of values and his idea of a "revaluation of all values" (his critique refers to both culture and society). Occasionally the philosophical critique was related only to one of values, and, in such cases, the author's goal was not to set aside one or more of them, but rather to construct a new theory, or at least a new point of view about beauty, truth, goodness, and so on; for example, in J. St. Mill's utilitarianism, the critique is addressed particularly to ethical conceptions from the history of philosophy and, at the same time, to active habits of that historical time, with a clear intention to change both ethical habitudes from a determined culture (the author's culture) and the philosophical models of goodness (how they were constituted in the history of philosophy).

Undoubtedly, the value has a theoretical and conceptual status in philosophy, in social sciences, and in public discourses. Hence, in such contexts its abstract aspect is naturally emphasized. But the values are firstly criteria for our evaluations addressed to different things, persons, etc. The formal kind in which they appear in order to perform such a function is the *value judgment*. In this paper, I will develop the idea about a "meaning of negativity" implied in the structure of a value judgment. My intention is, starting from Kantian theory about the judgment of taste (about the beautiful), to point out a direction in which a critique of the value is possible, but in such a way that just our prejudgments concerning beauty, truth, goodness, etc. can be "criticized", and, finally, reconstructed, at the same time with our judgments related to the culture, in general, to "my culture", especially.

The structure of my paper follows this intention and includes three main sequences:

- an introduction in Kant's theory on the judgment of taste;
- disclosure and interpretation of meaning of negativity belonging to the structure of value judgment;

- description of the genesis of this meaning of negativity, *i.e.*, non-judicative experience, and its consequences regarding our cultural prejudgments.

## §2. An introduction in Kant's judgment of taste theory

In the philosophical tradition of a critique of value, before two aforementioned moments (Nietzsche's revaluation of all values, and Mill's utilitarianism) there is other one very important, *i.e.*, Kant's theory of beauty. Until this theory (included in *Critique of the power of judgment*<sup>2</sup>), Kant dealt with the truth in *Critique of pure reason*, and pay attention to the goodness in *Critique of practice reason* and others papers. The philosopher reconstructs, by turn, the main values through different discourses; all of them being relied on the same principle: the separation of human mind faculties (or powers, in his terms). The beauty, for instance, is directly related to a mind faculty named „feeling of pleasure and displeasure“, and indirectly to the faculty of cognition known as “power of judgment”<sup>3</sup>.

Kant sets in the center of discourse about beauty the logical form of judgment, in whose structure beautiful has the position of predicate. All these appear in Kantian context in a *judicative* kind, *i.e.*, in concrete form of the *judgment* that was theorized and used in all the history of philosophy since Aristotle. Determined *judicative form* that is suitable for beauty is the “judgment of taste”. Kant does not take this kind of judgment as an absolute logical fact that means for him a cognitive judgment (synthetic *a priori* judgment), but rather, paradoxically, as an “aesthetic judgment”. We meet here a paradox, at least apparently,

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<sup>2</sup> Imm. Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992); edition cited: *Critique of the power of judgment*, translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

<sup>3</sup> As the faculties of the mind, there are also, along with the “feeling of pleasure and displeasure”: the “faculty of cognition”, and the “faculty of desire”. And, as faculties of cognition, together the power of judgment, there are still two: the understanding and the reason. See Kant 2002, 83.

since, on the one hand, the judgment of taste as a logical form (*S is beautiful*, where S is a certain subject), with entire structure of a cognitive judgment from the classical logic (firstly, subject and predicate, then, verb and time), relies on the synthetic function of the understanding, and on the other hand, the same judgment of taste is pure aesthetic and relies on the feeling of pleasure and displeasure (a faculty of mind totally different to faculty of knowledge). Formally, and at the first glance, to have an aesthetic character means, in this case, to get a non-cognitive “meaning” and to stay in a non-judicative condition. This fact is possible since in the structure of a judgment of taste one of the four mentioned elements from classical judgment, *i.e.* the verb (“be”, in its forms: *is* and *are*), seems to be not entirely present, with all its own functions. This is my first hypothesis in this paper: *in an aesthetical judgment the verb appears through an appresentation.*

Kant didn’t express this idea as such, but he claimed that in a judgment of taste the “object” (which is to be logical subject) does not appear itself as an “object”; only its representation appears, and this is related merely to a (living) subject who “judges aesthetically”. This representation only is the “object” of a free play of the cognitive faculties (imagination and understanding), and it cannot become an “object” of these faculties in their cognitive functions. Such an object is neither the subject (of the judgment, as a logical term), for it appears in/by its representation, nor the predicate, because in the structure of a judgment of taste, the predicate – always the beautiful – appears strictly as a result of an act of reflexivity performed by a (living) subject (with an existential meaning) and it cannot be a “concept”. Any “object” in Kantian sense must be conceptually determined, but in the structure of a judgment of taste there is only the representation of a certain object (not the object as such in a logical and ontological sense) that is not – and it cannot be – conceptually processed by an act of predication with a predicate-concept. But I think this “aesthetical” situation depends firstly on the verb and its functions, rather than on the predicate. Consequently, it does not depend on the subject and predicate as logical and formal position from the structure of a judgment. The object presented in/by its representation in the structure of a judgment of taste concerns the kind in which the verb is itself at work or performs its

actions thanks to a (living) subject. One sees, the verb (*to be*) doesn't have an existential (ontological) meaning, but rather only copulative one; formally, it only constitutes a function of relation (by which the two terms from the formal structure of a judgment, subject and predicate, are connected). Even this formal reduction of the verb to its copulative function has, regarding the content of a judgment, a negative meaning, since any ontological implications is rejected (or denied). On this basis, the object disappears, or, in other words, it appears only in/by its representation without any chance to overpass this status in the structure of a judgment of taste.

Therefore, *the judgment of taste is incomplete in comparison with the logical (cognitive) judgment, for an element from its structure, the verb, is only formal present, what means that the verb lost its "constitutive" function.* The lack of the conceptual function of the predicate (beautiful) is, somehow, a mere aspect of this "formal" reduction of the verb. This latter does not have one of its specific functions in the structure of this kind of judgment, namely existential one that is necessary for the logic (cognitive) judgment. Which are the main consequences of such a fact? Whatever will be the answer philosophically is very important the meaning of negativity as a main aspect of this type of judgment, *i.e.*, the "object" itself is lost through *the formal reduction of the verb*. And the formula that expresses the best this aspect is following: *Judgment of taste is non-objective*. This is a possible interpretation of Kant's idea about the judgment of taste as aesthetical one.

The representation of an object – that is a certain subject in a judgment of taste – is not determined by a concept, and by the rules of transcendental deduction that gives objectivity for knowledge, as in the case of cognitive judgment, Kant claims. The object appears merely by/in its representation that is connected to a subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction expressed by the predicate of this kind of judgment. The lack both of a concept and of conceptual functions in order to determining the object and its apparition in the structure of a judgment is, in Kant's opinion, the main reason for non-objective character of any judgment of taste. And for us, this aspect represents a proof for the presence of a meaning of negativity in the structure of this type of judgment.

The judgment of taste is nevertheless an “aesthetics judgment”, in this theory. It implies, and, somehow, it owns objectivity and universality – characteristics naturally belonging to the cognitive judgment – although there is no concept in its structure, and, consequently, no rule of the objectivity and universality based merely on the understanding (as a cognitive faculty). In a subjective and aesthetic meaning, these two characteristics rely themselves on the “common sense” (not on the understanding).

The aesthetic character implies, for a judgment, to be constitutively related merely to senses (sensitivity). But there are, in a Kantian context, two human facts that imply what belong to senses (sensitivity): on the one hand, the (objective) knowledge, and, on the other hand, the (subjective) pleasure or displeasure. In the first case, the concept is present; in fact, what is aesthetic participate to the transcendental deduction of categories (belonging to the understanding); the subject is conceptually determined by its predicate. In the second, what is aesthetic has no relation with the concept and, consequently, with an object that would have to receive the conceptual determination (by transcendental deduction). In respect of these two situations, Kant claims:

Here it should first of all be noted that a universality that does not rest on concepts of objects (even if only empirical ones) is not logical at all, but aesthetic, i.e., it does not contain an objective quantity of judgment, but only a subjective one, for which I also use the expression *common validity*, which does not designate the validity for every subject of a relation of a representation to the faculty of cognition but rather to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. (Kant 2002, 99-100)

A judgment of taste (about beautiful) has no relation with a concept or an object, but only with the representation of an object that stirs the feeling of pleasure and displeasure causing satisfaction or dissatisfaction, and with the meaning of negativity represented by the formal reduction of the verb. The object is not itself present; it has no function in constituting of those feelings or in the structure of corresponding judgment, *i.e.*, the judgment of taste. The absence of any object is very significant in order to appreciate the positivity of value implied here: the beauty. Of course, the beautiful is something as a characteristic of an “object” and consequently it has the positivity as any

something given (*datum, positum*). Kant claims that a general judgment with the beautiful as predicate is logic (cognitive). But in the structure of a judgment of taste, the object is not present as such because it appears in/by its representation determined through the reflexivity of a “living” subject. The representation of an object that is “judged” by faculties of a subject, different from the faculty of knowledge, can have a cognitive function in so far as this representation is subordinated to a concept, what is not the case. By itself, the representation – that has no relation with a concept or with an object, but rather it is taken in its own subjective autonomy – can play two judicative functions:

1. it leads to something agreeable, when there is an interest for a living subject in order to find a corresponding object as a determinate existence (as a being), and the predicate get predicative functions; the result is an aesthetic judgment with the “agreeable” on the logical predicate position;
2. it also leads to something beautiful, without any interest in the existence of an “object” corresponding to the representation; the result is a valid judgment of taste with the beautiful on predicate position, but a predicate without logical (cognitive) functions. Concerning this idea, Kant says:

I can call the first the taste of the senses, the second the taste of reflection, insofar as the first makes merely private judgments about an object, while the second makes supposedly generally valid (public) judgments, but both make aesthetic (not merely practical judgments) about an object, regarding merely the relation of its representation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. (Kant 2002, 99)

The relation between judgment of taste (about the beautiful) and an “object” that is appreciated as beautiful is beyond any ontological determination, because this object appears only by/in its representation that is “judged” – freely – as a satisfaction or as dissatisfaction, and the verb already suffered a negative reduction. Is very important here, on the one hand, just this above discussed absence of the object as such, and on the other hand, the intervention of the power of judgment in order to judge the representation of an object, by inciting the feeling of pleasure and displeasure that provokes satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Only if the object lacks, the judgment of taste can be pure. And Kant is interested



just in this sort of judgment of taste that supposes, in its constituting, the principle of common sense (taste). So, if such a sort of judgment is possible – and it is possible, just rely on this principle –, then it possesses a *meaning of negativity* in its own structure. The object is not present and, consequently, it cannot have a function in the structure of this type of judgment. The formal reason of this fact is a formal reduction of the verb, by which it focuses only to the copulative function. The meaning of negativity from the structure of the judgment of taste is itself constituted by a subject who constitutes, by himself, a pure judgment of taste as an expression of his feeling of pleasure and displeasure.

There is still an idea in Kant's theory about the beauty that is meaningful for this context where it is about a meaning of negativity from the structure of judgment of taste: the four definitions of beautiful. These definitions highlight the absence of any object in the structure of judgment of taste and, consequently, its meaning of negativity<sup>4</sup>. The representation of an object cannot "represent" the object as such. Certainly, the object is something: but it just is its own representation. This latter belongs to a living subject, and it is an outcome of his (subjective) activity. Even from the play of subjective powers, the beautiful (of an object given in/by its own representation) is constituted in a strict relation with the principle of common sense, receiving a "subjective" objectivity and universality.

Since taste is based on our senses – that is, taste is a *sensus* – there is not any principle that applies to the process of judgment. (...) Here, the object is evaluated without considering any concepts, but it is evaluated, in its sensational subjectivity; and even though we evaluate it based on our subjective feelings our evaluation is a universal one. (Atalay 2007, 50)

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- <sup>4</sup> Starting with the results of Kantian critique of aesthetic power of judgment, the four definitions of the beautiful can be so reformulated:
1. Qualitatively: *What is represented as the object of a satisfaction without any interest.* (The interest requires the existence of an object.)
  2. Quantitatively: *What is pleasing as the object of a universal satisfaction, without concepts.*
  3. Relational: *What is perceived as the form of the purposiveness of an object without the representation of an end.*
  4. Modal: *What is recognized as the object of a necessary satisfaction, without concepts.*

This subjective play does not engage the imagination and the understanding with their cognitive functions. Rather, these two faculties participate as simple subjective facts, but in such a way that their *free* play gains a result: an experience by which we appreciate – with the same non-logical predicate: the beautiful – different objects of the world, from inanimate things, to persons. In other words, an experience that is totally different to the cognitive one and to which the same faculties, imagination and understanding, *logically* participate and perform. But just this subjective free play is common to all acts of evaluation in which are implied all values, and not only the beauty. This idea is to be approached further.

### §3. Structural meaning of negativity of the judgment of taste

Let us remain just a moment in the horizon of Kant's philosophy of the beautiful, in order to emphasize the meaning of negativity presented in the structure of a judgment of taste. So, quantitatively, the judgment of taste is singular, Kant states. In any hypostasis, such a judgment affirms or denies that a subject (in logical sense) is beautiful. The beautiful, apparently, has its own foundation in an object (that is beautiful). But, in fact, because the object is not present than in/by its representation, the beautiful refers to this latter and it rather translates a feeling of the subject concerning pleasure and displeasure that is aroused, by a representation, in this (living) subject. The faculties (powers) that appear in this aesthetic play are imagination and understanding, but only by their non-objective and non-cognitive simple apparition. Also, the common sense (*sensus communis*) is itself, somehow, a sense (*sensus*). On this play with understanding and imagination (cognitive faculties), Daniel Wilson, referring to the §9 of *Critique of the power of judgment*, sets out:

The universal validity of the free play of the cognitive faculties explains Kant's usage of certain terms throughout §9. We should note that Kant refers to the *feeling* of the free play of the cognitive faculties, as well as the *sensation* of it. The significance of Kant's use of the term 'sensation' (*Empfindung*) of the free play indicates that it is a state that is an *objective* representation of the *senses*. This is contrasted with his use of the term 'feeling' (*Gefühl*) which, he says, at least for

representations of external sense sensation, must always remain merely subjective. Sensation of the free play is not a sensation of the other senses, however, but is instead a sensation of inner sense. (Wilson 2013, 130)

The judgment of taste appears in the formula: *S is beautiful* (where S is a logical subject, *i.e.*, a representation of an object). In other words, a representation of an object produces satisfaction or dissatisfaction in a subject that freely participates with his feeling of pleasure and displeasure. This latter power is only reflexive, because it “judges” the kind in which subjective powers or faculties (imagination and understanding) relate themselves each other. In conclusion, *the beautiful is non-objective*, how non-objective is also the judgment of taste. Starting from this idea, one must not only say: the beauty is subjective, because the absence of any object – the main characteristic of this judgment – would be veiled; but rather that objectivity has a meaning, since such a judgment is connected to the power of judgment, as a faculty of cognition, and it is constituted on the basis of common sense (taste) that is a “power” that occurs in all people as rational beings. In above mentioned judgment, the beautiful becomes a determined subject; consequently, it does not represent a predicate as in the structure of any judgment of taste. Moreover, the verb receives now an existential meaning, keeping also copulative one. The judgment: *The beautiful is non-objective* expresses the play of the beauty as a term in the structure of judgment of taste. But this judgment indicates a presence that, paradoxically, is absent, namely the constitutive intervention of an “experience” that makes possible the meaning of negativity from the structure of any judgment of taste, and even this passing of the beautiful from the position of predicate, to the position of subject in a judgment.

A determined object is beautiful only when a certain subject constitutes himself a representation of this object that arouses the feeling of pleasure and displeasure; consequently, the subject feels satisfaction or dissatisfaction. In a judgment of taste (about beautiful) any object is denied, and any empirical trace is erased: of course, if such a judgment is pure. On this basis, is obvious the idea that two thoughts are necessarily presented in the structure of any judgment of taste:

1. a (living) subject freely feels satisfaction or dissatisfaction related to the *representation* of an object by his/her feeling of pleasure and displeasure;
2. an object must be denied in order to catch such a subjective feeling (satisfaction or dissatisfaction) by the free play, however, of cognitive faculties.

Emphasizing the idea about the difference between the cognitive and aesthetical functions of cognitive faculties (imagination and understanding), Ted Cohen claims:

In an aesthetical judgment of taste, however, culminating in an experience expressed by 'This rose is beautiful', the Imagination is not being instructed by the Understanding, its conformity to the Understanding is 'free', and indeed no predicate concept is applied to the object (the rose). (Cohen 2002, 2)

Because no "predicate concept" can be applied on the "object" – in fact, on the representation of an object – the judgment with such a subject (just this representation of an object) is only aesthetic, not cognitive. Of course, the imagination and the understanding connect freely themselves, and the result is aesthetically judged by a subject possessing common sense.

When I say: *This rose is beautiful*, I tie together an affirmation about me and a negation about an object, namely even the object whose representation provokes for *me* satisfaction. In this respect, the judgment of taste is at the same time affirmative and negative, and the corresponding value, the beautiful, is constituted (by/in a judgment of taste) as something subjective and positive (the given satisfaction or dissatisfaction) on the ground of something objective and negative (the representation of an object). Therefore, something subjective and positive relies on something else objective and negative. Perhaps it is about here a very interesting operation of de-constituting of the knowledge of an object, or even of this object since it appears as/in its own representation, that happens in constituting our judgments of taste. And starting from the Kantian definition of the beauty from the perspective of relation, it can be about a de-constituting of morality (belonging a living subject), because the beautiful is "the form of the

purposiveness of an object, insofar as it is perceived in it without representation of an end" (120), and this end only can be, in accord with Kant's thought, a concept of our reason that has merely a practical or moral function. In this way, the beauty seems to suppose a play that is entirely different in comparison with other values (truth, goodness, and so on). But on the basis of a formal identity of all value judgments that comes from the status of their (logical) subject that is always a representation, we have to accept a meaning of negativity from their structure, and then, also, a common foundation of them: an experience whose nature *is not judicative* (or *is non-judicative*).

The negativity of beautiful appears, in a judicative structure, with two aspects:

1. the absence of an object that is given, however, in/by its representation;
2. the denying of morality of a (living) subject, who feels satisfaction or dissatisfaction by his feeling of pleasure and displeasure that is aroused thanks to that representation.

These two aspects are strictly related to Kant's theory on the soul faculties. If we move on to the idea about a single foundation of all kinds of value judgments, identified with a non-judicative experience, whose presence is signaled by that meaning of negativity from their structure, the result is a unity of entire field of all values. Of course, with such an idea we are beyond Kant's theory of the beauty and judgment of taste. Using a strict *analysis*, we make a step to revealing a common structure of all kinds of value judgments. And using an *interpretation*, we make the second step – that is the final, in my opinion – that consists in recognizing the presence of a non-judicative meaning just in the structure of any value judgment. This is a very important conclusion for my initial intention namely to indicate a common foundation of all kinds of value judgments. Just by these two operations – analysis and interpretation – a "new" space of investigation is opened and a "new" version of hermeneutics can be enacted: *a pre-judicative hermeneutics*.

Remaining in this Kantian philosophical horizon, one can observe that the four definitions of the beauty signify different functions from the perspective of meaning of negativity included in the structure of all judgments of taste. Thus, a relational definition indicates the second

aspect abovementioned (the denying of morality), while others three refer to the first aspect (an absence of any object). The beauty has no relation, either with the truth (as a value of knowledge), or with the good (as a moral value)<sup>5</sup>. It is independent to these two values and this fact is possible thanks to that meaning of negativity from the structure of judgment of taste by which it appears in the human world, itself becoming possible by the principle of common sense.

The meaning of negativity I talk about remains nevertheless a formal aspect of any judgment of taste. It only reveals the relations between formal elements of the structure of a judgment, subject and predicate, relations established by a “verbal reduction”: the verb, that is itself in the structure of a judgment of taste, is focused only on the copulative function, losing its existential role. The verb has just this function in any kind of value judgments, because in the structure of them a verbal reduction takes place. The first consequence of this reduction is to restrict the verb to its copulative function; afterwards, the meaning of negativity from the structure of all kinds of value judgments. We must again suppose that the possibility of such “judicative movements” is related to a sort of experience, since all elements of the verbal reduction are subjective or activated by a certain (living) subject.

#### **§4. Non-judicative experience as a foundation for all kinds of value judgments**

Apparently, the judgment of taste (about the beautiful) is purely subjective, since the object is absent and only its representation is present in its structure. But the main consequences of that meaning of negativity as a structural characteristic of a judgment of taste, and for all kinds of value judgments, how I argued, are related, at the same time, to the values. This meaning affects not only an individual-subject (with his faculties, powers), but also the object (as a subject in the formal structure of any value judgment), its “natural” objectivity. In fact, any object

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<sup>5</sup> I mention the dual character of the judgment of taste: it is affirmative and in the same time negative. In Kantian perspective, can be about the *infinite judgment*. Cf., in *Critique of pure reason*, the table of judgments.

(given as a judicative subject) receives, in the structure of a value judgment, a predicate that is even a value (beauty, truth, goodness, and so on); consequently, it must be considered as a relative “thing”. It cannot be an absolute term, as a perfect existence, but rather as a determined “being” near to others determined beings that can receive, in the judgment of taste, a value-predicate. This fact is obvious each time when a “thing” (a determined being) enters the structure of this kind of judgment as an “object”, *i.e.*, as a representation of an object, on the position of logical subject. A reflexive consciousness performs both the singularity of logical subject, in fact, an object that appears by its representation and receives the value (beautiful, goodness, truth, etc.) as its predicate, and the set of such subjects which receive the same value (in turn, one of aforementioned values) as their predicate.

Such an object is just in the fact-to-be-a-thing (or in its fact to be something) the opposite of Being: the nothing (what-is-non-being, the fact-to-be-nothing). And this fact is illustrated by the judgment of taste – we saw this – and by the value judgment, in general. When a “subject”, in an existential sense, evaluates or appreciates an “object” – in fact, its representation – as beautiful, good, true he/she realizes that *She/He is* in a concrete kind into the world, near to many objects that can “disappear” – at least ones of them – when they are evaluated or appreciated only by subjective human faculties. Here is the main sign of the relativity of any value and, of course, of any culture since the value is an active and fundamental element of the culture. In fact, a culture is an axiological structure that implies a hierarchy of values. But the relativity of values points out also that people belonging to a cultural space can appreciate in the same kind different objects, despite many differences between them as individuals. And just this situation in which more and more people express the same satisfaction or dissatisfaction, by their feeling of pleasure and displeasure about the same “object” (that is, the phenomenological “objectuality”), or express the same reason regarding the truth or goodness about the same fact (objectuality), is a good reason in order to rethink the concept of objectivity. Now, this fact is not in our attention. Nevertheless, the meaning of negativity from the structure of value judgments signifies also the non-objectivity of beauty, truth, goodness, each of them as a value.

This result is directly suitable for the beautiful, as a consequence of this interpretation of Kant's aesthetics in the perspective of the meaning of negativity from the structure belonging to any judgment of taste. But this idea is suitable, I think, for any value judgment, and, at the same time, for any value. Kant does not admit such a result: the truth and the goodness, in difference of the beauty, have both universality and objectivity, because they are closely related to the concept: the first (truth) to concepts of the understanding, and the second (goodness) to concepts of the reason. Of course, given this idea, we must separate from Kantian point of view concerning judgment of taste and common sense, its condition of possibility, because the meaning of negativity is owned to all kinds of value judgments and values. What we, as living subjects, "reflect" and constitute in the case of beautiful, we reflect and constitute always when it is about any values and just this idea of such a performance was claimed and argued in this paper.

In conclusion, the negativity is not a characteristic merely of the judgment of taste and of the beautiful, but also in general for all value judgments and for any value. The formal principle of this extension there is even in the structure of value judgments. It is about a structural identity of all pure value judgments: the logical subject is a representation of an object, and the predicate is a value (beauty, truth, goodness, etc.). From this idea we can draw other one: the meaning of negativity has a necessary place in any value judgment. And further: *in a value judgment is implied – with a constitutive function – the result of a non-judicative experience, that constitutes the foundation of its own negativity, since the experience implied in the constituting of value judgments is not judicative (it cannot belong to the set of elements from a judgment)*. In fact, the validity of such an idea about the meaning of negativity constitutively implied in the structure of any value judgment is based not on the principles of common sense (of the taste), as Kant claims about the universality and objectivity of a judgment of taste (about the beautiful). This validity relies on the experience that can be possible by a "living subject", an individual. This latter keeps – for herself/himself – something that cannot be directly passed in the structure of a judgment with the goal to be known and recognized by other people (although, nevertheless, is kept just in order to attract them towards the same outcome of their



“feeling”). Such a living subject or an individual – or an individual existence – constitutes (performs) herself/himself the meaning of negativity for the structure of any kinds of value judgments, and not only for judgments of taste. And this experience is non-judicative one because it happens outside of the judgment horizon; but in order to constitute a value judgment of any kind.

Starting with this idea about the meaning of negativity implied in the structure of all value judgments, as a basis of their universality (that remains, despite this fact, subjective), one can understand that a value with all its subjective and objective aspects is valid in any cultural space, in any historical culture. Nevertheless, the universal validity of a value is not a natural characteristic of a culture. When someone takes for granted an unconditioned universality of values, the consequence is a phenomenon recognized by us in our intercultural relations: the “cultural imperialism”. This phenomenon supposes the pretention of people from a certain culture that an active value at work in this culture has a universal validity and, further, that it can be imposed to people from other cultures, all around the world where it is not already active. Rather, *the value is non-objective*: this affirmative judgment with negative predicate opposes itself to the prejudgment about a validity and universality of any value from a determined culture; at least, because it comes from a non-judicative experience, or from an individual experimentation that can aspire, of course, to universality, but to “subjective” one (that is constituted by a living subject and recognized as such by other subjects because themselves perform the same experience). Starting from whole significance of this judgment (*the value is non-objective*), including the meaning of negativity, one can critique not only a number of prejudgments that concern the universal validity of values, but also the phenomenon above mentioned as “cultural imperialism”. And in this way, we can pass from a theoretic attitude to a practical one, in our life.

Of course, the critique of this unconditioned pretension to universal validity of a value that is at work (in other words, is active) in a certain culture started long ago; in philosophy, for example, in romanticism as a cultural ideology that was philosophically constituted, or, recently, in the philosophical hermeneutics. Despite of this, the cultural prejudgments of this kind are still very powerful and wide-

spread in contemporary cultures. Perhaps, this critique would become enough powerful in its continuous rethinking and practice, in order to dislocate our prejudgments concerning the objectivity and universality of *our own* values and particularly of *our own* value judgments; *i.e.*, only in accepting, on the one hand, the relative being of any value, and, on the other hand, the negativity as an expression of such a relative being, which, in its turn, is an outcome of a non-judicative experience. So, the recognizing of a meaning of negativity in the structure of any kind of value judgments and, consequently, of values, along with the attention towards outcomes of a non-judicative experience become important conditions in our explanations, interpretations, and practices related to historical cultures and, also, to intercultural relations.

The value judgment must nevertheless keep a sort of universality. Kant, we know, talked about a subjective universality that is relied on the principle of common sense (or taste) and valid only for the judgment of taste (about the beautiful). But we rejected this point of view, because the meaning of negativity founded expressively in the structure of a judgment of taste (about the beautiful) was extended to the structure of all kinds of value judgments. The principle which we search is given only in/by the non-judicative experience; it is itself just this sort of experience. The particular conditions in which such an experience occurs, its own subjective or individual commitments, the particular scenarios and structures, the consequences that it entails beyond that meaning of negativity from the structure of value judgments are all of them aspects very important, and would have to be investigated. But what is very important for this context is represented by the limits which are imposed by the idea of negativity to our prejudgments concerning the universality and objectivity that characterized many representatives of contemporary cultures. Perhaps, by researching these limits and their principles, *i.e.*, on the one hand, the meaning of negativity from the structure of any kinds of value judgments, and on the other hand, the non-judicative experience, we will be able to understand in more suitable measure the culture in which we live and the role of other cultures in defining own cultural identity.

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