Claudiu Mesaroș
Perhaps one of the most used terms in the recent philosophy is that of philosophical practice. It has attracted philosophers some years ago but eventually it has been accepted as such. But there are many problems still to be discussed, like the nature of a philosophical practice in general. Is the philosophical practice as used today in the counselling manuals the same term with the epistemologically connoted term of a practice in Wittgenstein or David Hume? If not, then is it the case that we should aim at standardizing the meaning of what a philosophical practice is nowadays? Some insist against such a claim, while others offer different orientational meanings for it. We attempt at discussing the nature of philosophical practice and its main contributions in order to arrive at a critical evaluation from the standpoint of the spiritual practices or exercises as proposed by Pierre Hadot, assuming that this supports an anti-standardization position based on the idea that the philosophical practices should rather be taken as non-systematic sets consistent with the ways ancient schools developed maps of complex and intensively verified, problem-oriented practices, according to a Platonic non-systemic view regarding the multiple contexts moral concepts can be functional.